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Desgning Subsidies for Low-Carbon Energy

David Weisbach*

This paper is a revision of remarks made by Professor David A. Weisbach of the
University of Chicago on Friday, April 5, 2013, at the University of Missouri School of

Law during the 2013 Journal of Endornntal and Ast'ainabilityLaw and Tax Law
Society Symposium entitled "Promoting Sustainable Energy Through Tax Policy".

DESIGNING SUBSIDIES FOR Low-CARBON ENERGY

My topic today is the design of subsidies for renewable (i.e., low
or zero carbon) energy. I want to investigate whether we can subsidize
clean energy but not at the same time have to pick between types of clean
energy or choose the overall mix of energy technologies. The goal should
be to make sure that clean energy is not at a systematic disadvantage
because users of fossil fuels can dump carbon pollution into the
atmosphere for free but once that disadvantage is corrected, to allow the
market to determine what mix of energy sources is best. While some
people may feel confident that they or the government can pick the mix of
energy sources that we should use, I'm confident that they or the
government will guess incorrectly. Therefore, I want to investigate
whether a subsidy can be neutral across the choice of technologies.
I was originally going to ask a different question, which is what a
level-carbon playing field would look like. The reason for this original
question was my belief that the tax system was tilted in favor of fossil
fuels so that an easy way to level the playing field would be to eliminate
tax subsidies for fossils. This belief turns out to be false: the tax system if
anything currently "favors" clean energy over fossil fuels. ("Favors" is in
scare quotes for reasons I will explain immediately below.)
Table 1 is a list of tax expenditures for energy for the year 2011
Clean energy tax
taken from the Administration's 2013 budget.'
that by any
indicates
glance
casual
A
highlighted.
are
expenditures
measure they dominate the list.

1Office of Mgmt. & Budged, Exec. Office of the President, Budget of the United States
Government, Fiscal Year 2013, 249 (2012) (Estimates of Total Income Tax Expenditures
for Fiscal Years 2011-2017) available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2013/assets/spec.pdf.
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Tax Expenditure (2011)

Cost in 2011 ($ millions)

Credit for energy efficient
improvements to existing homes4
2

Energy production credit

1,560

3

Percentage depletion
Credit for residential energy efficient

1,190

5

Energy investment credit
6 50% expensing for equipment used in67
6 refining liquid fuels
and
exploration
of
7 Expensing
development

840
700

500

costs

8

Alcohol fuel credits

500

9

Advanced energy property credit

430

10

Credit for clean coal

370

Table 1: 2011 Tax Expenditures for Energy

Table 2 is the same list projected out to the period from 2013 to
2017. The same conclusion applies. A more sophisticated study by the
National Academies that attempts to model the full macroeconomic effects
of these tax expenditures confirms this. 3

2 /d
3SeNational Research Council, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE
GAS

EmissioNS (William D. Nordhaus, et al. eds., 2012).
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Tax Expenditure (2013-2017)

Cost in ($ millions)

1 Energy investment credit

12,210

Energy production credit

9,330

3 Percentage depletion

6,860

4 Credit for residential property efficiency

5,000

5 Expensing of exploration and development

2,950

6 Credit and deduction for clean-fuel burning
:_vehicles

2,110

7

Credit for clean coal

1,710

8

Exclusion of utility conservation subsidies

1,020

9

Advanced energy property credit

costs

10 50% expensing of equipment used in refining
liquid fuels

700
(3,020)

Table 2: 2013-2017 Tax Expenditures on Energy

I also originally thought that the level playing field metaphor was
helpful; that asking what a level playing field for energy would look like
was a meaningful question. A cursory examination, however, shows that
this metaphor gets in the way of thinking rather than helping it along.
There is no way to determine what a level playing field would be without
making a host of assumptions, and once you start making assumptions, the
assumptions drive the conclusions and the metaphor is not doing any of
the work except possibly making the assumptions less transparent. You
have to analyze the policy choices and consider the resulting effects to
determine the right policies toward clean energy.
A simple example is the use of the word "favors" above. If the tax
system had no special provisions for energy, clean, dirty, renewable, or
something else, would it be a level playing field? Under one possible
definition, yes, as it does not explicitly favor one form of energy over
4
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another. But users of fossil fuels would still be allowed to dump their
carbon pollution into the atmosphere for free, so perhaps a level playing
field can only be achieved if there is a carbon tax or an equivalent policy
such as an auctioned cap and trade system.
Suppose we had a tax on carbon emissions. Would that get us to a
level playing field? Perhaps not. There is a massive fossil fuel
infrastructure. Now that it is built, the marginal cost of fossil fuel energy
is low. This infrastructure was built with substantial subsidies. Although
the history may be contested, the start-up fossil fuel industry arguably had
help. It did not have to survive in the competitive marketplace. To have a
level playing field, the start-up clean energy industry arguably should
receive the same subsidies when building out its infrastructure.
Determining the correct amount of help that would lead to a level-playing
field, however, would be near impossible because most of those subsidies
relate to now-depreciated infrastructure and the competitive marketplace
looks completely different. To put clean energy on a level playing field,
we have to determine the depreciated value of the subsidies and what the
equivalent would be in a today's market, which would be a formidable and
really impossible task. Even determining what a subsidy is would be near
impossible: is a choice to build a road rather than a railroad a subsidy for
automobiles and therefore a subsidy to the fossil fuel industry?
And even if we could do that, we still might not have a level
playing field because clean energy is in its early stage of development, at a
time when research into new ideas and approaches is vital. As we know
from the last several decades of research into economic growth, we may
need to subsidize new ideas because they create positive externalities in
that they build the stock of knowledge which all can use.4 That is, even
with something like perfect markets and subsidies to offer the historical
benefits to fossil fuels, we may want to subsidize R&D.
4 S8PHILLIPPE AGHION & PETER HEWIT, THE EcoNoMICS OF GROWTH [NEED
PAGE
NUMBER] (Mit Press, 2009); 9als DARON ACEMOGLU, INTRODUCTION TO MODERN
EcoNoMIC GROWTH [NEED PAGE NUMBER] (Princeton Univ. Press 2009).
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At this point, the level playing field metaphor has ceased any
possible usefulness. We instead need to focus on policies that produce
good results given the information constraints we face. Hence, it is better
to focus on what sort of carbon pricing system we should have rather than
the meaning of the term level. I've written about the design of a carbon tax
in the past and still strongly support the idea.5 I will focus here almost
exclusively on the design of subsidies. This is partly because I think the
chance of Congress enacting subsidies is much higher than the chances of
a tax and also because we may want subsidies even if we have a tax for the
reasons I just mentioned.
My core claim is that we cannot design a technology-neutral
subsidy. Before exploring this claim, I will discuss the nature of the
climate change problem to give a sense of how important it is to get our
carbon pricing system right.

I.

THE CLIMATE CHANGE PROBLEM AND ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE

I will try to illustrate the climate change problem, widely viewed
as one of the most complex problems we as a society face, using two
pictures and a table. The goal is to simplify the problem as much as
possible while capturing the core issues. There is, I should emphasize,
massive uncertainty about what we should do given that we cannot predict
how climate change will affect us and what the costs of avoiding those
harms will be. Nevertheless, I think the core of the problem can be made
quite simple and in doing so, some aspects of it that are otherwise hidden
become transparent.
My first figure, Figure 1 shows the recent results from models that
couple climate forcing with the carbon cycle. 6 The x-axis is cumulative
s SL Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Daign of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARv.
ENVTL. L. REv. 499 (2009).

Myles R. Allen et al, Warrring causi by cumuvlative carbon erisdons towards the
trillionth tonne, NATuRE, Apr. 30, 2009, at 1163; Malte Meinshausen et al, Greehousegas miision targets for lirrtingglobal warning to 2 C,NATuRE, Apr. 30, 2009, at
6
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emissions, the simple sum of emissions in the past, not depreciating them
or adjusting for whether they have been absorbed into the land or ocean or
anything fancy. It is just the total amount we have emitted to date. The yaxis shows the expected temperature change from those emissions. The
straight line shows the relationship between the total amount of carbon
emitted to date and the expected temperature increase. The line is straight
not for simplicity. It is supposed to be straight because current best
estimates are that the relationship is roughly linear. Each additional ton of
carbon emitted produces an additional unit of warming. The line is drawn
to show the IPCC's central estimate of climate sensitivity: if we emit I
trillion tons of carbon (not C0 2), we get 20 of warming. The light gray
lines show the possibility of higher or lower climate sensitivity. The
relationship is linear regardless but if the climate is more sensitive to
carbon, it is steeper and if it less sensitive, it is shallower.
The figure offers us a very simple way of understanding the effects
of emissions on temperatures. Add up total past emissions, find that spot
on the x-axis and see the expected temperature increase.
It also shows something that, while perhaps known, is not as clear
as it should be: as long as we keep emitting, cumulative emissions go up
which means that temperatures keep going up just as fast. Every tick mark
on the x-axis leads to an increase in temperatures.

1158; Myles R. Allen et al, The adt strategy, NATURE, Apr. 30, 2009, at 56; H. Damon

Matthews et al, Theproportionality of global warnring to cumulativecarbonerissor%
NATURE, June 11, 2009, at 829.
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Figure 1: Relationship between cumulative emissions of carbon and
expected temperature increase

The stark implication is that there is no safe level of emissions
other than zero. Said another way, for any given temperature increase,
there is a fixed carbon budget. For example, if we want to keep
temperatures at, say two degrees, there is a cumulative amount of
emissions that gives us that temperature increase. If we use the central
climate sensitivity drawn on the graph, we can emit at most 1 trillion tons
and have a fifty-fifty chance of the temperature increasing by two degrees
or less. Anything more than that, and we should expect to get more than
two degrees of warming. If we want to have better odds of staying below
two degrees of warming, our budget is smaller.
The simple conclusion is this: the ultimate target of climate change
policy has to be to reduce emissions to zero. Cutting a bit, conserving

8
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some, a bit of C02 storage, a few windmills, and so forth, will not do it.
Emissions have to go to zero. To be sure, cutting and conserving delays
the time until zero so these may be highly desirable policies, by they do
not change the real goal.
As stark as this conclusion is, there is worse news. If we continue
on the path we are on now, and we adopt the two degree cap on
temperatures that is widely used, we will hit the trillion ton limit in the
immediate future - somewhere between 2040 and 2050. As of now, we
have emitted about 570 billion tons of carbon.7 We are currently emitting
around nine billion tons of carbon each year, and the number has been
going up. If we immediately stopped increasing emissions and held them
constant, we would only have about fifty more years before we hit one
trillion tons. To get a sense of that time period, the average life of a
typical coal plant - as of today 1200 new ones are scheduled to be built - is

50 years. If instead of stabilizing emissions, we continue to increase at the
same rate we have for the last twenty years, we will hit the trillionth ton in
2041 .8 This is a mere twenty-eight years from now or about half the life of
the coal plants currently being constructed. If we start reducing emissions,
we can push this date out perhaps to 2100 or 2150 depending on how
much we reduce and how fast. Even so, if we hope to limit temperature
increases to two degrees, we are rapidly approaching the point at which
emissions have to be zero.
To get a sense of the size of the reductions needed in this short
time period, consider President Obama's promise from his 2008 campaign
which was to reduce emissions by eighty percent below 2005 levels by
2050. The EU has agreed to something similar. In 2005, the US emitted
just under twenty tons of CO 2 per person, so a target reduction of eighty
percent means that we can emit less than four tons per person.9

7 TRILLIONTHTONNE.ORG,

' Id.

http://www.trillionthtonne.org (last visisted July 23, 2013).

EnissionS WORLD RESOURCES INsTrruTE ( last visited July 24, 2013),
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/CountryGHGEmissions (search "United States" for "Search for a
9 Country GHG
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One way to get some perspective on this number is to consider
when historically we emitted that amount. The relevant data is in Table 3.
Before reading the table, take a guess. The answer, as you can see from
the table, is sometime around 1875. This was before the invention of the
light bulb, the Model T, the radio, and the airplane. It was before the
modem economy and modem standards of living were developed. We
need the energy use of today's economy with the emissions of 1875, just
to get part way toward the ultimate goal.
Year
1975
1950

tCO 2/person
20
16

0

Technology
First PC (1980)
First jet engine flight (1941

1925

15

Frozen food (1929)

1910

14

1900

8.7

Model T Ford (1908)
Radio (1901), air conditioner (1902), airplane

1890

6.4

Tesla's generator (1886), AC motor (1889),

1880
1870

4.0
2.6

(1903), plastic (1907)
dishwasher (1886)

Edison light bulb (1880), steam turbine (1884)
Otto internal combustion engine (1876)
Table 3: Per capita emissions for selected years.

If you are not depressed enough, well, I'm not done. You might
think since most emissions are from fossil fuel use, that all we have to do
is cut our energy use and replace what is left with clean sources. That
would be correct with the exception of the word "all".
My second figure, Figure 2, illustrates the connection between
wealth and energy.
The x-axis shows per wealth, graphed on a
Country" and search "2005" for "Narrow by Year"; choose "Per Capita" from right side
menu; choose "Emissions by Gas" from left side menu).
'0 Country GHG ErrisionM WORLD RESOURCES INSTYTUTE ( last visited July 24, 2013),
http://cait2.wri.org/wri/CountryGHGEmissions (search "United States" for "Search for a
Country" and search "1870-1975" for "Narrow by Year"; choose "Per Capita" from right
side menu; choose "Emissions by Gas" from left side menu).
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logarithmic scale and the y-axis shows per capita energy use, also on a
logarithmic scale, measured in a standard unit of kilograms of oil
equivalents (basically it converts all energy use in the equivalent amount
of oil needed to produce that energy). There is a remarkable connection
between wealth and energy use. We simply do not know how to be
wealthy without using large amounts of energy. Nobody does. No matter
how green and nature loving a country is, nobody achieves wealth without
massive use of energy. There is nobody in the bottom right hand corner.

5000

-

0500

-

50

Permany

-

100

1000

10000

GDP per capita

100000

Figure 2: Relationship between wealth and energy use

The only way to stop climate change without being poor is to find
massive amounts of clean energy. The problem of climate change is one
of energy transformation, done as quickly as possible, before we hit the

1 Kg OE/person values based on author's calculations. GDP per Capita values based on
data obtained from World Bank, seeTHE WoRLD BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/country/united-states (last visited July 24, 2013).
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trillion-ton limit. It is a technology problem and an infrastructure
problem. It is one of the great challenges of the twenty-first century.
II. TAXES AND SUBSIDIES
The tax system would seem to have a fairly obvious role to play.
A tax on emissions creates incentives to reduce emissions by changing
prices. With a carbon tax, energy prices overall would go up and fossil
fuel energy would become relatively more expensive as compared to
renewables. People will both reduce their energy use and substitute to
cleaner forms of energy. There will also be to invest in R&D to develop
cleaner energy because it can now compete against fairly priced fossil
fuels. Moreover, a carbon tax is neutral across technologies and allows
the private sector to choose winners and losers.1 2
A carbon tax is also relatively easy to implement. In prior work
with Gib Metcalf, I showed that we can impose a tax on all emissions of
carbon dioxide from fossil fuels in the US by taxing only 2,500 entities, all
of them large sophisticated taxpayers.' 3 The key is to impose the tax
upstream on oil refiners, coal mines, and natural gas wells or processors.
The tax is then embedded in the price that the ultimate customer sees.
Finally, a carbon tax has the potential to raise an incredible amount
of money in times of great fiscal need. The US emits about five point five
billion tons of carbon dioxide a year. If the tax were twenty dollars a ton,
which is a relatively low starting point, it would raise about $1 trillion
over the ten year budget window, even accounting for emissions

12 A cap and trade system is roughly equivalent to a carbon tax. In a cap and trade system,
we set a limit on emissions and sell the rights to emit up to that limit. People still see a
price, just like in a tax, but it occurs via the need to buy permits rather than a direct
payment to the government. If the cap is set so that the price is equal to the desired tax,
the two are rough equivalents. For a discussion, sgearrrallyDAVID WEISBACH, U.S.
ENERGY TAX POLICY 113-158 (Gilbert E. Metcalf, ed. 2011) (referring to a carbon tax).
13Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Daign of a Carbon Tax, 33 HARv. ENVTL.
L. REv. 499 (2009).
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reductions due to the tax. If the tax rate were to go up over time, as would
be expected in most designs, the amount would be larger.
While it would seem that imposing a carbon tax or the equivalent
cap and trade system is the obvious approach, it is apparently a pipe
dream. It violates two central beliefs of Republicans, who currently
control the House: It is a tax and it is designed to stop what they claim is a
mere hoax, climate change. It also raises the single most transparent price
that consumers face: the price of a gallon of gasoline. While this position
is unreasoned and unreasonable, without the House, we cannot have a
carbon tax.
The alternative taxing fossil fuels is subsidize clean energy. As
noted, we might want subsidies for clean energy even if we have a carbon
tax because of the positive externalities from R&D. If we cannot have a
tax or an equivalent such as a cap and trade system, the argument for
subsidies is much simpler. Subsidies for clean energy are needed because
users of fossil fuels get the implicit subsidy of dumping their carbon
pollution into the atmosphere for free. A subsidy for clean energy is
needed simply to level the playing field, if I can get away with using that
phrase.
Even if we could design the best possible subsidy for clean energy,
it would still be clearly inferior to a carbon tax. A tax does two things: it
raises the price of energy and it tilts the prices away from fossil fuels. In
response to a tax, people will reduce overall energy use and shift to clean
energy. A subsidy only does the latter. It gets the choice between energy
types correct but does not address the choice between energy use and all
other goods. Energy would still be too cheap relative to the climate
change costs it imposes, so people would still use too much energy.
Subsidies are no substitute for a tax.
If we must use subsidies instead of a tax, the subsidy should at
least be neutral with respect to technology choice, both with respect to
which fossil fuels are replaced and which renewable technology replaces
them. There is simply so much uncertainty about energy technology that
13
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it is hard to believe that we can successfully pick the right mix by fiat. Do
we really know, for example, whether battery technology will evolve
sufficiently to make electric vehicles a workable solution for transport or
whether a better approach is to use hydrogen fuel cells? Solar has the
potential to have much higher energy density than wind - solar energy has
far greater watts per square meter than wind does - but do we know
whether the technology will develop to capture that higher density? The
relative advantage of gas over coal in terms of emissions depends on the
price of implementing carbon capture and storage at scale which we do not
know. The goal of a subsidy should be to make the choice between
renewables and fossil fuels reflect the emissions costs from fossil fuels,
not to choose what energy mix we use.
A carbon tax achieves this automatically because it adjusts the
price of fossils, not renewables. Gasoline cars, for example, would bear
an additional cost. Hydrogen and electric vehicles would then compete
with neither of them getting a preference. Coal-generated and gasgenerated electricity would be more expensive, and by different amounts
reflecting their relative emissions. Wind and solar would have to
compete. The government does not need to decide the mix if it imposes a
carbon tax. Can we achieve the same thing with a subsidy?
My thesis is that we cannot. The reason is that the amount of a
subsidy is the price of the avoided emissions. The avoided emissions,
however, depend on the technology that is being replaced. If we replace
coal with a renewable energy source we have different avoided emissions
than if we replace gas or petroleum. And if we replace inefficient systems
of whatever fuel, we should get more of a subsidy that if we replace
efficient systems because the avoided emissions per unit of energy would
be higher.
An illustration may help. The production tax credit ("the PTC")
provides a credit of about 2 cents/kWh for the use of wind. 14 This is about
14 26 U.S.C.§ 45 (2013).
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the same as a $25/ton carbon tax on the use of coal.' 5 Therefore, if a
reasonable carbon tax would be $25/ton, which is in the range often
mentioned, we can argue that PTC gets the wind price right in the absence
of such a tax. It allows consumers to choose between wind and coal fully
taking into account the emissions from coal. Both are subsidized by the
same amount: coal through the free dumping of emissions that should cost
$25/ton and wind through the tax credit.
Suppose, however, that the wind energy replaces electricity from
natural gas. Gas has about half of the carbon per kilowatt of electricity as
coal. If we do the same calculation for gas, the subsidy for wind is too big
by a factor of two. The PTC is equivalent to approximately a $45/ton
carbon tax on gas. If the carbon tax is only $25/ton C0 2 , the PTC gives
wind too much of an advantage over gas. The PTC cannot get the tradeoffs of both wind for coal and wind for gas correct. If it gets one correct,
it gets the other one wrong. If we lower the PTC to 10/kWh so that we get
the tradeoff between wind and gas correct, wind would be at a
disadvantage relative to coal.
The problem is not unique to the PTC. It is general. There is no
way to design a subsidy for clean energy that is neutral across
technologies. The reason is that clean energy competes with three fossils
and each has different emissions per unit of energy. Moreover, even
within a fossil fuel, there are different efficiencies (and therefore, different
levels of emissions) for different systems.
The right subsidy for
renewables when competing with petroleum is not the same as the subsidy
when competing with gas or coal.
Said another way, we want to raise price of different fossil fuels by
different amounts because each fuel has different emissions. The correct
subsidy is the avoided emissions. A single subsidy for renewables cannot
reduce the price of renewables by three (or more) different amounts so it
1s There are 860 grams of CO 2 per kilowatt for typical coal power. Some manipulation of
this figure produces the $25/ton value.
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cannot match avoided emissions for three different fuels. A subsidy cannot
have the neutrality properties of a tax.
What can we do in the face of this problem? Perhaps we can get
close. The idea would be to have a different subsidy for different
renewable technologies depending on which fossil fuel it primarily
competes with. If a technology replaces petroleum it would get one
subsidy and if it replaces goal, it gets another and gas a third.
Getting such a system even within the ballpark of right would be
tricky and perhaps not possible, although it may be our only choice. The
problem is determining what fuel is the marginal source of energy that a
given renewable competes with. To illustrate, suppose we are designing a
subsidy for clean energy such as wind which is used to produce electricity.
To determine the correct subsidy, we must determine which fuel the clean
energy source is competing with. Sometimes we may know this, but often
it will not be clear. Most new electricity in the US is from gas so perhaps
the correct subsidy should be based on emissions from gas. But wind may
instead compete with old coal plants: the choice might be to retire an old
coal plant and replace it with wind turbines or keep it online for a few
more years and to forget the wind turbines. If this is so, the correct
subsidy should be based on emissions from coal, not gas. Maybe the best
thing to do is to use some sort of average emission from a given sector and
understand that it is just a rough number. We have a problem to solve.
The perfect may be the enemy of the good.
What is the correct subsidy for transportation technologies? This
might seem easy because currently all transportation relies on various
forms of petroleum, such as gasoline or diesel. The energy for the
alternative transportation technology, however, has to come from
somewhere. For example, the electricity used to charge a battery comes
from the grid and the ultimate source may be coal, nuclear, hydro, gas, or
really a mix of whatever feeds into the grid at the instant that the battery is
plugged in. The subsidy for transportation technologies has to consider
this substitute fuel and determining which substitute fuel is used involves
the same sorts of calculations needed to determine the subsidy for wind or
16
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solar electricity. If we add a large number of electric vehicles to the fleet,
power-generation capacity has to be increased, so we need to know the
marginal source of this additional capacity and this could be from either
coal or gas (even when all new generation comes from gas because the
marginal source of power might be keeping old coal plants online).
Perhaps I'm thinking about this the wrong way. Maybe the key
thing we need is a technological breakthrough. After all, a glance at
Figure 2 shows that we need massive amounts of clean energy, not just
incremental improvements. If so, then maybe we should be thinking of
the right level of subsidy as the one that can produce the breakthrough. It
does not matter what fuel the renewable competes with today. What
matters is achieving a breakthrough.
I do not think this is right for two reasons. First, reducing the cost
of clean energy is largely one of gradual field-level improvements. While
we cannot rule out a breakthrough - cold fusion or dilithium anti-matter
drives might be in our future - but we should not hold our breath. Instead,
energy improvements tend to come in incremental change as we improve
the conversion technologies. Second, even if we think there might be a
breakthrough, its value depends on avoided emissions, so we still have to
set it based on what types of fuels are avoided.
It seems clear that a carbon tax or an equivalent cap and trade
system is superior to subsidies for clean energy. A carbon tax gets all
marginal correct - both intensive and extensive - and is automatically
neutral on technology choice. A subsidy does not fix the incentive to use
too much energy. My thesis here is that it also cannot easily be made
neutral with respect to the choice of technology. It unfortunately seems
clear that a carbon tax is unlikely, and we may be stuck with subsidies for
renewables. The best we can do in this case is to approximate a neutral
subsidy by considering the avoided emissions from a particular
technology.
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